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I. INTRODUCTION
Canada is widely seen as an example of what can be
1
accomplished by effective tobacco control efforts. The country’s
numerous policy precedents have been replicated in many
countries and have shaped international efforts on tobacco
regulation, such as the World Health Organization’s Framework
2
Convention on Tobacco Control. The result of Canada’s policy
interventions is a decline in cigarette smoking over the past quarter
3
century that few countries have been able to match.

†

Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Ottawa; Special Lecturer, Division
of Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Nottingham.
1. David Sweanor & Ken Kyle, Legislation and Applied Economics in the Pursuit
of Public Health: Canada, in TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY: STRATEGIES, SUCCESSES AND
SETBACKS 71 (Joy de Beyer & Linda Waverly Brigden eds., 2003).
2. See World Health Org. (WHO), Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008).
3. See Donald W. Gardner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe
Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of
Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 523–24 (1997); Jennifer Lesny,
Tobacco Proves Addictive: The European Community’s Stalled Proposal to Ban Tobacco
Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 149, 165 n.143 (1993); see also Health
Canada, The National Strategy: Moving Forward—The 2006 Progress Report on Tobacco
Control, Jan. 15. 2007, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/pubs/tobac-tabac/prtc-relct-
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The accomplishment is based, in part, on the fact that Canada
started with such a horrendous problem. In the early 1980s, when I
first started working full time on tobacco control efforts, Canada
had one of the most serious smoking problems in the world. Per
capita cigarette consumption was among the highest in the world,
with over 40% of fifteen to nineteen-year olds reported to be daily
4
smokers.
There were no legislated restrictions on tobacco
advertising, no legislated package warnings, and negligible
5
protection from environmental tobacco smoke. Cigarette taxes
6
were not only low, but had fallen in real terms for decades. This
situation can be attributed in part to the fact that the tobacco
manufacturers were powerful and extremely well connected
7
politically. Also, Canada was a large producer of tobacco with a
crop size that, on a per capita basis, was considerably larger than
8
that of the United States at the time.
Currently, Canada has tobacco taxes that are not only among
9
the highest in the world, but are also expressly linked to the goal
10
of reducing smoking.
Tobacco advertising and promotion are
11
12
essentially banned, retail displays are disappearing, graphic
13
health warnings cover half the cigarette package, and additional
14
health information is required as package inserts.
Federal law
mandates extensive constituent testing and requires disclosure of
15
the results to the federal health department. All cigarettes must
16
meet reduced ignition propensity standards. In addition, smokefree spaces for public (and many private) areas are mandated by
17
and there are legislated—and enforced—restrictions
law,
18
regarding where and to whom cigarettes can be sold.
2006/part2_e.html#1b (showing a greater than 60% decline in per capita
consumption from the early 1980s to 2005).
4. Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 73 (citing Health Canada, Canadians
Smoking: An Update, Cat. No. H39-214/1991E (1991)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 74.
7. Id. at 73.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 87–90.
10. Id.
11. See Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13, pt. IV(22) (1997).
12. Id. at pt. IV(29)–(30).
13. Id. at pt. III(15)(1); Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 84.
14. Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13, pt. III(15)(2).
15. Id. at pt. I(7).
16. Id.
17. See Non-Smokers’ Health Act, R.S.C., ch. 15, pt.(3) (1985) (stating that
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As a direct result of these policy interventions, per capita
cigarette consumption in Canada is down by roughly 60% in the
19
past quarter century. Canada entered the 1980s with a reported
20
smoking prevalence of over 40%. By 2006, only 18% of Canadians
fifteen years and older reported being smokers and only 14%
21
reported being daily smokers.
Perhaps even more impressive,
reported daily smoking among fifteen to nineteen-year olds
decreased from 42% at the beginning of the 1980s to only 9% in
22
2006.
In examining the way policy changes have so dramatically
reduced cigarette consumption in Canada, there can be a tendency
to think that Canada is somehow different from other countries
and that tobacco control policies were somehow easier to achieve.
But public policy is like a game of football. Political changes do
not happen spontaneously any more than a football moves up or
down a field on its own. Policy issues, like footballs, move based on
the forces brought into play. In Canada, the health side of policy
was not actively engaged in the politics of tobacco until the early
23
1980s.
Once health policy became an issue, the country was
radically transformed through a long series of campaigns, and
virtually everything found on most standard lists of tobacco control
24
strategies has now been implemented.
This raises some interesting questions, not the least of which is
why a lawyer who was a key player in so many of these regulatory
battles, who built a career around fighting for such measures and
convincing others that policy interventions were the most
important measures available to counter the health toll of smoking,
would now be asked to talk about “the limits to regulation.” To be
honest to our long term health objectives, however, it is extremely
important to critically examine what has been accomplished
nothing in the act requiring smoke-free environments affects any rights to
protection from tobacco smoke under any Act of Parliament or provincial
legislation).
18. See, e.g., Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13 (1997) (limiting how, where, and to
whom cigarettes may be sold); Smoke-Free Ontario Act, R.S.O., ch. 10 (1994)
(“No person shall sell or supply tobacco to a person who is less than 19 years
old.”).
19. See Health Canada, supra note 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 74–81.
24. Id. at 74–95.
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through policy interventions, to be open to the thought that some
of our interventions have not achieved all of our goals, and to think
about where tobacco control policy needs to head in the future.
II. “CHECKED ALL THE BOXES”
Canadian tobacco control advocates are perhaps in an ideal
position to consider the limits of regulation because Canada is one
of a growing number of countries that have implemented virtually
all of the components of traditional comprehensive strategies to
25
The country has “checked all the boxes.”
reduce smoking.
Despite all of the policy successes and the dramatic reductions in
cigarette smoking over the past quarter century, however, there are
26
still over 4.5 million Canadians who smoke, and smoking is still
27
the country’s leading cause of preventable death. Further, many
policies have reached either a limit on what can be done, or at least
a state of greatly diminishing marginal returns.
Tobacco control is not unlike efforts to contain other causes of
disease where measures have been used that reduce the severity of
a problem but still leave a large number of people who appear
unresponsive to standard treatments. The medical profession deals
with such issues on an ongoing basis, and the role of skilled
physicians is to consider the limits of standard treatments, prevent
iatrogenic conditions, and look to new interventions that can lessen
the remaining risks. Public policy advocates dealing with tobaccocaused disease should be just as vigilant.
III. OBSTACLES TO TRADITIONAL REGULATION
Simply doing “more of the same” is a seemingly attractive
option when actions to date have worked remarkably well. But, as
with doctors who might be tempted to treat an antibiotic-resistant
disease with more of the same antibiotics—after all, the treatment
worked successfully with plenty of other people presenting with
similar symptoms—it is important to consider the limits, as well as
the successes of our interventions.

25. Id.
26. See Health Canada, Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/research-recherche/stat/_ctumsesutc_
2006/wave-phase-1_summary-sommaire_e.html.
27. Health Canada, Smoking and Your Body, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/body-corps/index_e.html.
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A. Diminishing Returns
The first broad category of limits to regulation in Canada is
the decreasing marginal benefits of simply continuing to apply
traditional tobacco control interventions. An example of this can
be seen in relation to tax policy. Canada was able to dramatically
increase the price of cigarettes, in part because the price had been
28
so low. Tripling real prices has a tremendous dampening effect
29
on consumption, but tripling prices again is nearly impossible.
Among other issues facing Canada, there is now a significant
30
contraband market. Although hard to estimate, it appears that
cigarettes manufactured on, or shipped through, Indian Reserves
could account for as much as 20% of current cigarette
31
The
consumption in Canada’s two most populous provinces.
presence of these alternative, untaxed sources of supply clearly
limit the pursuit of policies that are aimed at making tobacco
products less available to smokers through further tax increases. At
the same time, measures aimed at requiring cigarettes to be made
less palatable to smokers or otherwise trying to force smokers to
32
quit via regulation become less viable in the face of this illicit
supply.
In effect, tobacco control policy aimed at forcing

28. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 91 (figure showing that the retail
price for 200 cigarettes in Canada was less than twenty Canadian dollars into the
early 1980s).
29. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO
EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE MPOWER PACKAGE 39 (2008), http://www.who.int/tobacco/
mpower/mpower_report_full_2008.pdf [hereinafter WHO REPORT] (“A 70%
increase in the price of tobacco could prevent up to a quarter of all smokingrelated deaths worldwide.”).
30. GFK RESEARCH DYNAMICS, ILLICIT USAGE OF CIGARETTES—NATIONAL STUDY
FOR THE C.T.M.C.—CANADIAN TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS COUNCIL 8 (2007)
(showing that 22% of purchased cigarettes in 2007 in Canada were contraband, an
increase from 16.5% in 2006).
31. In Ontario, 31.6% of cigarettes purchased were contraband. Id. at 11.
40.7% of contraband cigarettes were bought on Indian Reserves. Id. at 26. As a
result, approximately 12.9% of all cigarettes purchased in Ontario were
contraband bought on Indian Reserves. In Quebec, 30.5% of purchased cigarettes
were contraband. Id. at 11. 20.6% of contraband cigarettes came from Indian
Reserves. Id. at 26. Thus, about 6.3% of all cigarettes purchased in Quebec were
contraband bought on Indian Reserves.
32. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, TOBACCO-FREE PHARMACIES
(2006), http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/pharmacy-backgrounder.pdf (advocating banning sales of tobacco in pharmacies).
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abstinence is running into some of the same constraints as past and
33
present prohibitionist approaches to alcohol and other drugs.
Further examples of diminishing returns from our policy
interventions can be found in the realm of smoke-free policies.
Making all workplaces and public areas smoke-free is expected to
have a significant impact on both the number of smokers and the
34
amount of cigarettes that are consumed. A tremendous number
of smokers are impacted when workplaces and public areas go
smoke-free, but once we move into the realm of “tidying up the
leftovers”—such as trying to extend smoke-free policies into areas
like shared residential buildings—we can expect less overall impact,
simply because we are dealing with far smaller numbers of affected
people. There are certainly gains that can still be made through
the application of more traditional approaches to tobacco control,
but such gains pale in comparison to both the accomplishments of
the past (the low hanging fruit is gone) and to the magnitude of
the projected future health toll from smoking.
B. Self-Imposed Limits
The second broad category of limits on regulation is,
paradoxically, effectively self-imposed by the culture of the tobacco
control movement. Canada has done much to reduce smoking
onset, encourage cessation, and protect non-smokers. Now, the
country is running up against the limits of tobacco regulation
caused by the attitude of the now-entrenched anti-tobacco
35
community to regulation. Tobacco control advocates have, like
other social groups, developed their own paradigms through which
36
they see the world and possibilities for further interventions. As
Thomas Kuhn’s work demonstrates so well, such paradigms dictate

33. See generally CRAIG HERON, BOOZE: A DISTILLED HISTORY 235–66 (2003)
(discussing Canada’s experience with Prohibition in the 1920s).
34. See WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 26 (“Smoke-free laws in workplaces
can cut absolute smoking prevalence by 4%. Smoke-free policies in workplaces in
several industrialized nations have reduced total tobacco consumption among
workers by an average of 29%.”).
35. See, e.g., Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, About Us,
http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/pschome_about.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2008). The organization has “one goal,” which is “the reduction of tobacco-caused
illness through reduced smoking and exposure to second-hand smoke.” Id.
36. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 24 (2d
ed. 1970) (“[T]he paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a
detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.”).
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what is acceptable and can blind people to effective alternative
37
courses of action. The result is that a critical limitation on further
regulation is actually self-imposed by the views of tobacco control
advocates. This can either cause the pursuit of less effective health
interventions or prevent the pursuit of strategies likely to yield
38
greater gains.
Further regulatory progress is, for example, constrained by
lobbying for impractical goals based on an ideological view of
appropriate interventions rather than a pragmatic public health
orientation. A group sharing an ideology often sees such schemes
as deeply desirable, but these schemes stymie progress on policy
interventions by redirecting energy and resources from practical
goals to unattainable, ineffective, or even counter-productive
strategies. Examples of this, in the case of Canada, include
39
pursuing the nationalization of the tobacco industry and pursuing
restrictions on tobacco use that cannot be justified on the basis of
protecting others, such as promoting prohibition of the use of any
40
tobacco product anywhere on the grounds of hospital campuses.
C.

Existing Regulations Seen as an End Instead of a Means

A further limitation on regulatory strategies is that, in some
cases, existing regulatory measures, such as blanket advertising
bans, graphic package warnings, or industry de-normalization, have
come to be seen as an end in themselves rather than as a means of
41
As such, efforts to re-think
achieving improved public health.
such measures are often rejected out-of-hand by anti-tobacco forces
37. See id. at 64 (“In the development of any science, the first received
paradigm is usually felt to account quite successfully for most of the observations
and experiments easily accessible to that science’s practitioners.”).
38. See id. (“[P]rofessionalization leads, on the one hand, to an immense
restriction of the scientist’s vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm
change.”).
39. See CYNTHIA CALLARD ET AL., CURING THE ADDICTION TO PROFITS: A SUPPLYSIDE APPROACH TO PHASING OUT TOBACCO 14–15 (2005), http://www.policy
alternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2005/curing_the_addiction_
summary.pdf.
40. Ottawa Hospital instituted a campus-wide smoke-free policy in June 2006.
Ottawa Hospital, Designated Smoking Areas, http://www.ottawahospital.on.ca/
media/extras/smoke-zones-e.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). However, the
hospital changed the policy in November 2007 and now allows smoking in three
designated outdoor areas. Id. Unintended consequences of the policy included
effects on patient and employee safety, as well as on neighboring businesses. Id.
41. See, e.g., WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 36–38 (advocating “complete”
and “comprehensive marketing bans” on tobacco companies).
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as being “a step backwards.” Yet, this is inconsistent with the
pragmatic approaches and recognition of the differences between
means and ends advocated by such social reformers as Saul
42
Alinsky, and it can stymie further progress at attaining health
goals. For instance, a regulatory strategy could include advertising
less toxic tobacco products to current smokers as an alternative to
cigarettes, mandating smoker-friendly package messaging aimed
directly at facilitating cessation, or differentiating between the
culpability of different tobacco companies as a way of changing the
behavior of the tobacco companies that are benefiting most from a
status quo centered on cigarettes. In the absence of a willingness to
re-examine previously passed regulatory strategies, however,
progress in such areas is impossible.
This self-imposed constraint on acceptable action by some of
those promoting a tobacco control agenda is perhaps most
notable—and most damagingly counter-productive—when one
examines the issue of harm reduction for nicotine users. There is
no scientific doubt that there is a vast continuum of risk depending
43
If all smokers obtained
upon how someone obtains nicotine.
their nicotine from medicinal or low-toxicity non-combustion
products, the health concerns about the drug would approach
44
those associated with the contemporary use of caffeine. Yet many
tobacco control advocates generally dismiss the idea of harm
reduction in favor of an abstinence-only (or “quit-or-die”)
45
orientation. The result is that these tobacco control advocates
42. See generally SAUL ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (Vintage Books ed. 1989)
(1972).
43. See, e.g., Neal Benowitz, The Safety and Toxicity of Nicotine; TOBACCO
ADVISORY GROUP, ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, HARM REDUCTION IN NICOTINE
ADDICTION: HELPING PEOPLE WHO CAN’T QUIT 88–103, 119–29 (2007), available at
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/Listing.aspx (follow “Harm reduction in
nicotine addiction” hyperlink) (discussing the variety of sources of nicotine and
the use of nicotine replacement therapy); Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging
Market for Long-Tern Nicotine Maintenance, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1087 (1997)
(discussing alternative nicotine-delivery products and a variety of regulatory
approaches).
44. See BENNETT ALAN WEINBERG & BONNIE K. BEALER, THE WORLD OF CAFFEINE,
303–15 (2001) (discussing how caffeine does cause physical dependence, and
toxicity in high doses, but that caffeine use has been normalized). Although
physical dependence results, it has not been classified as a clinical dependence
syndrome. Id. at 303, 306–08.
45. See WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 7 (“We must act now to reverse the
global tobacco epidemic and save millions of lives.”). The WHO estimates one
billion deaths from the “tobacco epidemic” in the twenty-first century “unless
urgent action is taken.” Id. at 6.
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often sound more like moralists seeking to save souls rather than
46
health campaigners seeking to save lives. This is consistent with
what has been experienced in numerous other public health
47
campaigns throughout history and a critical question for future
policy directions is just how quickly tobacco control efforts can
evolve to become more pragmatic rather than dogmatic.
Abstinence-only orientation, among other things, has greatly
limited the ability to implement product standards that can reduce
risks for continuing users of nicotine, thereby fulfilling the “fourth
48
leg of public health interventions.”
This orientation is also
strongly at odds with past successful efforts to regulate goods and
services which have been principally based on the recognition of
differential risks and the resulting ability of regulation to reduce
49
death, injury, and disease. The failure to accept harm reduction
strategies as part of its regulatory armamentarium has also
sacrificed the moral high ground on the issue of the human rights
of smokers.
It has gone so far as to include gross

46. Id. “The cure for this devastating epidemic is dependent not on
medicines or vaccines, but on the concerted actions of government and civil
society.” Id. at 7.
47. See, e.g., ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (1st ed. 1985) (discussing
efforts to curb venereal diseases in the United States since 1880); ESTHER KAPLAN,
WITH GOD ON THEIR SIDE: HOW CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS TRAMPLED SCIENCE,
POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S WHITE HOUSE 194–218 (2004)
(discussing the Bush administration’s effort to combat teen pregnancy and STDs
through an abstinence-only message); JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING
THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989) (discussing the campaign to
pass the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906); David Sweanor et al., Tobacco Harm
Reduction: How Rational Public Policy Could Transform a Pandemic, 18 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 70 (2007) (discussing alternative systems of nicotine delivery and a harmreduction approach, as opposed to an abstinence-only approach).
48. See Sweanor et al., supra note 47, at 70 (delineating four broad categories
of intervention aimed at “reducing the risk of death, injury or disease from any
behaviour” as “efforts to prevent the behaviour ever taking place, efforts aimed at
ending the behaviour, efforts aimed at preventing the activity from harming third
parties, and efforts aimed at reducing the risks of those who engage in the
behaviour”); see also David Sweanor, Legal Strategies to Reduce Tobacco-Caused Disease,
8 RESPIROLOGY 413, 417 (2003) (discussing both legislative and litigation efforts to
address tobacco use).
49. See e.g., SANDRA HEMPEL, THE STRANGE CASE OF THE BROAD STREET PUMP:
JOHN SNOW AND THE MYSTERY OF CHOLERA (Univ. of Cal. Press 2007) (2006)
(discussing John Snow’s effort to discover the cause behind an 1854 London
cholera epidemic); YOUNG, supra note 47 (discussing the pre-cursors to the
eventual regulation of food quality).
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misrepresentations of relative risk in an apparent effort to adhere
50
to an abstinence-only agenda.
IV. WHICH WAY FORWARD?
Canada stands as a good example of the limits of standard
tobacco regulatory measures and, simultaneously, the limits
imposed by the tobacco control community itself on what may be
seen as acceptable regulatory measures. Seeking a way forward via
the next generation of tobacco control is of huge importance if
Canada is to successfully reduce the projected toll of a million
smoking-caused deaths in the country over the next quarter
51
Canada is also at the leading edge of global tobacco
century.
52
The path Canada takes will be of enormous
control policy.
importance to the rest of the world because it is projected that a
53
billion smoking-caused deaths will occur globally this century.

50. See, e.g., Can Tobacco Cure Smoking? A Review of Tobacco Harm Reduction:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Richard
Carmona, U.S. Surgeon General) (“Smokeless tobacco is not a safe alternative to
cigarettes.”); Carl V. Philips et al., You Might as Well Smoke, BMC PUB. HEALTH 4,
Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2458-5-31.pdf
(identifying 108 websites claiming “risks from [smokeless tobacco] are as bad or
worse than those from smoking”). “[U]se of Western smokeless tobacco (ST) is
substantially less harmful than smoking cigarettes.” Id. at 1. See also PHYSICIANS FOR
A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘SWEDISH EXPERIENCE’: IS SNUS UP TO
SNUFF? (2003), http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/snus.pdf (discussing health
effects of a Swedish smokeless tobacco product).
51. See PARVIS GHADIRIAN, SLEEPING WITH A KILLER: THE EFFECTS OF SMOKING ON
HUMAN HEALTH 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hlvs/alt_formats/hecs-sesc/pdf/pubs/tobac-tabac/swk-dat/swk-dat_e.pdf.
About
one in six smokers are projected to die by the 2020s–2030s, and there were 5.4
million Canadian smokers in 2001. Id.
52. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 71 (stating that the number of
Canadian smokers declined from 1965–2001 from 50% of the population to 22%).
53. WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 6.
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